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Aesthetics and Literature: a Problematic Relation? 
Peter Lamarque 
 
I 
 
Among philosophers of art it is simply taken for granted that literature falls within the 
purview of aesthetics. My aim is not in the end to challenge this assumption but to 
show, first, that it is not as obvious as might be supposed, second, that it does not 
presuppose, and should not rely on, reductive accounts of either literature or 
aesthetics, third, that it entails a conception of literature not always fully 
acknowledged and, fourth, that, when properly characterised, it converges with 
familiar principles of literary criticism.  
 
It is worth noting at the outset that literary critics on the whole show a marked 
reluctance to acknowledge the relevance of aesthetics to literature. This in itself ought 
to be more surprising than it is to philosophers of art for whom, as noted, the matter is 
barely controversial. Of course there could be many reasons for this reluctance, not 
least a narrow view of what counts as aesthetics. An insight into the worries that 
literary critics have with the aesthetic comes from a recent exchange between three 
prominent critics, Frank Kermode, emeritus professor of English at Cambridge, 
Geoffrey Hartman, emeritus professor of English at Yale, and John Guillory, current 
chair and professor of English at New York University. This occurs in a volume 
entitled Pleasure and Change: The Aesthetics of Canon, published in 2004, which 
gives the text of Kermode’s Tanner Lectures at Berkeley with comments by the other 
two critics.1 Kermode’s aim is precisely to relocate at least some notion of the 
 2
aesthetic – specifically the idea of “aesthetic pleasure” – in the vacuum left by the 
demise of “Theory” evident since the turn of the 21st century. The ostensible focus is 
on canon formation and the extent to which judgments of aesthetic quality, apart from 
what Kermode calls “collusion with the discourses of power”, could validly be 
thought to underlie the shaping of the canon.2  
 
Although the critics Hartman and Guillory are happy to move with Kermode beyond 
the simplistic ideological analyses of 1990’s cultural critics, they both express 
scepticism about aesthetic pleasure. Guillory notes “the pervasive embarrassment with 
the subject of pleasure [in the critical community], and the ease with which pleasure 
has been neutralized as the merely contingent effect of reception”.3  His own unease 
with aesthetic pleasure stems from suspicion about “higher pleasures” and the 
traditional elevation of poetry among the literary arts. Although he accepts—more 
readily than Kermode himself—the specificity of aesthetic pleasure among other 
kinds of pleasures he is inclined, against Kermode, to reject the link between pleasure 
and canonicity. Hartman finds the very concept of pleasure, in the literary context, 
“problematic” and “descriptively poor” and speaks of its “onomatopoeic pallor”. To 
the extent  that pleasure is indeed at the heart of the aesthetic—a point to which we 
shall return—then the scepticism voiced by Guillory and Hartman about the bearing 
of aesthetics on criticism is probably widely shared. However, Kermode is not 
entirely isolated. The critic Harold Bloom, for example, famously led an attack on 
fashionable literary theory at its very height in the 1990s in the name of the 
“autonomy of the aesthetic”.4 Like Kermode, Bloom defends the canon on the 
grounds of aesthetic value while recognizing that “the flight from or repression of the 
aesthetic is endemic in our institutions”.5  
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To compress the debate drastically and crudely, the “flight from the aesthetic” among 
critics seems to stem from several sources: the politicisation of criticism in the heyday 
of Theory and the thought that appeal to aesthetic quality is reactionary and tainted 
with unwelcome ideological accretions;6 a shying away from value judgments of any 
kind; a belief that any reference to pleasure or emotion or experience or indeed to a 
phenomenology of reading is marginal to the critical enterprise; and, by implication, 
the thought that the very vocabulary of aesthetics, as exemplified in Frank Sibley’s 
famous list of aesthetic concepts—unified, balanced, integrated, lifeless, serene, 
somber, dynamic, powerful, vivid, delicate, moving, etc—is itself peripheral to 
substantial critical discourse. 
 
What is curious, however, is that philosophical aestheticians, who readily accept a 
place for literature within aesthetics, often share many of the reservations found 
among literary critics.  Aesthetic pleasure is not a prominent topic for aestheticians 
who write about literature,7 nor is much serious effort made to promote an aesthetic 
vocabulary in describing literary works. What place, then, does literature hold within 
contemporary aesthetics?  
 
First of all, it finds a natural place in philosophy of art, which is often treated, 
mistakenly, as identical with aesthetics. Few aestheticians doubt that literature should 
count as one of the arts. After all, when the fine arts were initially characterised in the 
early 18th century poetry was included along with painting, music, sculpture and 
dance and indeed the idea of an “ars poetica” goes back beyond Horace to the ancient 
Greeks. There is little dispute that poetry is one of the high art forms and the artistry 
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of poetry is not hard to discern. Yet it is a curiosity of current discussions of literature 
within aesthetics that almost nothing is written about poetry per se. Most attention is 
given to narrative fiction in the novel or drama but it is at least not obvious that there 
is a unified conception that conjoins poetry and prose fiction under the label “fine 
art”. 
 
Among the cluster of issues that do occupy philosophers writing about literature, 
questions about cognitive and ethical values still rank high (as they did for the ancient 
Greek philosophers) as do debates about authorial intention in criticism, and about 
fiction and emotion. Yet it is a characteristic of these debates that they seldom focus 
on specifically literary, far less aesthetic, features. The question about emotional 
responses to fiction has been dominated by examples from film, mostly genre 
varieties like horror. Other issues about fiction—reference, truth-value, and 
ontology—apply indifferently to non-literary as well as literary narratives and usually 
are focused in theories of meaning or metaphysics. It is perhaps for this reason that 
they have never caught the attention of literary critics. The key debates about 
intention, cognition and ethics also arise, indiscriminately, for other art forms and the 
core arguments do not rest crucially on the nature and status of literature. All in all, it 
is far from obvious that when philosophers turn their attention to literature they are 
really engaged in aesthetics at all, as opposed to philosophy of language, metaphysics, 
ontology, epistemology, moral philosophy, and at best a broadly conceived 
philosophy of art. 
 
II 
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So if literary critics are sceptical and philosophers only marginally interested what 
future is there for an aesthetics of literature? More precisely what might be involved 
in supposing literary works to be proper objects of aesthetic attention and aesthetic 
appraisal? Kermode and Bloom are no doubt right that some conception of aesthetic 
pleasure is integral to such an approach but their literary critical opponents are also 
right to be suspicious of this. Kermode gets off on the wrong foot by seeking to 
naturalize the pleasures of literature, via Freud and Roland Barthes, identifying them 
with a heady mix of sexuality (Barthes’ jouissance), transgression, and what he calls 
“dismay”. Apart from the fact that this simplistic psychologizing is hopelessly vague 
and open to counter-example, the highly implausible idea that there is a distinct 
phenomenology associated with reading literature can only discredit the enterprise 
that Kermode is engaged in. A characterisation of the aesthetic pleasure that literature 
can afford is not some empirical datum with which the enquiry starts but at best a 
destination reached from quite other premises. 
 
If aesthetics is to be at all relevant to literature it must deploy recognizable features of 
aesthetic appraisal as applied more widely but it must also capture something 
distinctive about literature as an art form. This is by no means an easy task or even 
one that the subject matter obviously demands. After all, aesthetic appraisal in most 
other contexts is connected in some way with perception or sensory experience or the 
“appearance” of objects and it is often supposed that this already distances literature 
from other art forms and indeed from aesthetics. Is there anything sufficiently 
analogous to the experiential side of aesthetic response to make the literary case worth 
considering in this context? The answer, I believe, is Yes but it will not be found in 
reductive accounts of jouissance or transgressive pleasures. The key is in a suitably 
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qualified conception of appreciation.8 If it can be shown that there is a distinct mode 
of appreciating literature as literature or as art then the first crucial step will have 
been taken to establish that an aesthetics of literature is possible and worthwhile.  
 
We should look, I suggest, to Frank Sibley, rather than Immanuel Kant and the idea of 
disinterested attention, for inspiration on how to proceed. The Sibleyan tradition of 
aesthetics suggests important constraints on how an aesthetic approach might be 
developed, although we need not be committed to all Sibley’s specific claims. Sibley 
identified a range of concepts (noted above) which serve to characterize aesthetic 
aspects of art or other objects. Setting aside the question of how useful such concepts 
are to the literary critic, it is important to acknowledge some benefits of the lists he 
assembled.  
 
One benefit is to show that aesthetics is not exclusively confined to beauty, as it 
seemed to be in the 18th century. To speak merely of the “beauty” of literary works is 
as anodyne as speaking merely of the “pleasure” they afford. Sibley showed that 
aesthetic appraisals, thus aesthetic interests, are considerably wider than that. Another 
benefit is his recognition of the subtly different ways in which descriptive and 
evaluative elements can interact in aesthetic concepts.9 Aesthetic characterisations are 
not always or only ways of evaluating works; they also have implications for how the 
work appears, what impact it has, what is salient in it, what merits aesthetic attention. 
Aesthetic descriptions bring such matters to light. 
 
There are also three more substantive theses in Sibley that seem especially pertinent. 
The first is the view that aesthetic properties are emergent or gestalt properties that 
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require something more than merely sensory perception for their discernment. Sibley 
maintains that only people possessing a certain kind of “sensitivity” or “taste”, itself 
subject to training and improvement, will be able to apply aesthetic terms correctly 
and engage in aesthetic appreciation. Something parallel is true in the literary case, 
namely that mere grasp of the language is not sufficient to appreciate a work 
aesthetically. Whether or not a particular sensibility is called for might be open to 
question10 but that some skill is involved beyond linguistic competence seems certain. 
Literary appreciation is not a natural but a trained mode of discernment. 
 
The second Sibleyan thesis relates to this, namely that there is no logical or even 
inductive relation between an object’s non-aesthetic properties and its aesthetic ones. 
No list of non-aesthetic—physical, structural, perceptual—properties entails (or 
makes probable) the presence of an aesthetic property. The idea that aesthetic 
concepts are not condition-governed has, of course, been challenged,11 although we 
need not rule on that now. But there is at least a case for saying in the literary 
application that a work’s emergent aesthetic features, of a kind that will be 
exemplified later, are not deducible from textual features alone. 
 
Thirdly, Sibley’s aesthetic particularism has an application in the literary context. 
This is the view that aesthetic judgments are not generalisable. From the fact that in 
this work this combination of non-aesthetic features contributes to this aesthetic effect 
it does not follow that there is a generalisable principle that states that whenever that 
or a similar combination occurs the same effect will follow.12 For example, the use of 
the “same” poetic imagery—love as a rose, time as a tyrant—in different works never 
ensures sameness of aesthetic effect.13
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One of the principal lessons from the Sibleyan tradition is that aesthetic qualities, 
while related to non-aesthetic qualities, are not reducible to them. The temptation to 
reduce literary works to instances of more familiar or more tractable kinds is the 
biggest obstacle to a successful characterisation of literary aesthetic appreciation. 
Only if literary works can be shown to be objects of a distinctive kind of aesthetic 
appraisal, and to promote and reward such appraisal, will it be possible to set apart the 
literary sphere as a subject worthy of its own treatment within aesthetics. But the 
tendency to “naturalise” literature is strong, for example, to see works of literature as 
no more than pleasing pieces of language. If the aesthetics of literature has any hope 
of finding a coherent, central and defensible place for aesthetic pleasure, for aesthetic 
features distinct from merely textual features, for a sui generis mode of aesthetic 
appreciation, and for some conception of aesthetic value then it needs to avoid the 
temptation of reduction on several fronts:  
• to any one literary form (such as poetry),  
• to purely linguistic properties (semantic, syntactic, or rhetorical),  
• to formal properties (such as style or structure),  
• to purely hedonistic conceptions of pleasure,  
• to intuitive, “natural” or untutored “responses”, and  
• to any form of “art for art’s sake” aestheticism. 
 
III 
 
 9
I am going to focus on three kinds of reduction, which I see as obstacles to an 
aesthetics of literature, each of which has its adherents. One is to form, one is to 
meaning, one to a certain kind of narrative realism. 
 
A prominent temptation in trying to characterise literature in aesthetic terms is to 
reduce literature to “fine writing” or “belles lettres”. In itself the idea is not 
implausible for there is indeed a generic sense of “literature” where it means just that. 
Fine writing is exemplified across nearly all modes of discourse: history, philosophy, 
biography, letter writing, political speeches, as well as throughout the more narrowly 
defined literary arts, drama, poetry and the novel. And it is not uncommon to describe 
such discourses, when well written, as “literary”.  
 
Fine writing is easier to recognize than to define. David Hume’s philosophical writing 
frequently exhibits literary or aesthetic qualities, as when he describes his 
philosophical journey in the Treatise: 
Methinks that I am like a man, who having struck on many shoals, and having 
narrowly escap’d ship-wreck in passing a small firth, has yet the temerity to 
put to sea in the same leaky weather-beaten vessel, and even carries his 
ambition so far as to think of compassing the globe under this disadvantageous 
circumstances.14
It is not only the metaphorical figure that contributes to the literary effect but also the 
phrasing, structure, cadences and choice of words. I suggest, though, that we should 
look to rhetoric rather than aesthetics to characterise the effectiveness of writing of 
this kind. Perhaps surprisingly, I am not inclined to build the aesthetics of literature on 
the base of “fine writing” or on a belleslettrist conception of literature.  
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For one thing, giving focus to fine writing affords no principled way to distinguish 
between “literature” in the generic sense and “literature” in the narrow sense of 
literary art.15 The label “imaginative literature” for the latter is not entirely 
satisfactory for it is not as if the imagination has no role in other discourses. If 
imaginative means fictional then that seems to favour certain kinds of literary works, 
such as novels, over others, such as lyric poetry. It is better, as we shall see, to draw 
the distinction between literary artworks and works of history, philosophy, or 
biography, independently of “fine writing”, in terms of conventional modes of 
apprehension. Fine writing might be a sufficient condition for literature in the generic 
sense but it is not sufficient for literature as art and arguably not even necessary. 
Those novels, for example, that are written in the first person through the narrative 
voice of a child (such as Catcher in the Rye) or someone uneducated (such as True 
History of the Kelly Gang, Peter Carey’s novel) might not exemplify fine writing as 
that is normally understood, even if the writing is described as clever, effective, 
moving, or realistic. Other reasons altogether qualify the writing as literature or as art. 
 
It might seem perverse to set aside fine writing when addressing the aesthetic qualities 
of literature so a further word needs to be said on this. Of course aesthetic pleasure is 
to be had in good writing wherever it appears. Nor is it uncommon for critics to use 
aesthetic concepts—expressive, moving, powerful, resonant, striking—to characterise 
poetic usage. But good writing in literary art is seldom an end in itself, rather a means 
to some further end or effect. Mellifluous prose or delicately nuanced imagery will 
not always be appropriate in every literary context, say, in a dialogue (in a novel) 
between drunken members of street gangs. Rhetorical or formal devices, like 
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figurative language, imagery, alliteration, rhyme schemes, repetition, metre, do not 
have intrinsic aesthetic value but gain their effectiveness by the contribution they 
make to a desired end, be it emotional impact, realistic depiction, humour, or poetic 
insight. The use of alliteration, rhyming couplets, or enriched figuration affords no 
aesthetic pleasure, for example, if used to convey bad news.16  
 
The important theoretical point, though, is that formal or rhetorical devices are in 
themselves textual features, identifiable independently of discursive aims and often 
subject to learnable rules. They acquire aesthetic significance only when assigned a 
function within an artistic structure.  Here is an example. Consider a critic’s 
observations on certain rhetorical features in these well-known lines from 
Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey”: 
 
   … a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,  
And the round ocean, and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:  
A motion and a spirit, that impels 
All thinking things, all objects of all thought, 
And rolls through all things. 
 
Some of the sweep of this passage is also to be explained by the repetition of 
‘and’: ‘And the round ocean, and the living air, / And the blue sky, and in the 
mind of man’. In conventional prose ‘and’ would normally signal the end of a 
list, but here, no sooner has Wordsworth thought to end it than some other 
facet of nature’s multitudinouness occurs to him. The list is apparently 
endless, and Wordsworth’s profligate way with connectives all adds to the 
sense of amplitude and prodigality. This impression is strengthened by a 
similarly extravagant use of ‘all’: ‘All thinking things, all objects of all 
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thought, / And rolls through all things.’ The omnipresence of the ‘a’-sound is 
also worth noting: seven consecutive lines in this section begin with it, and all 
the singular elemental words—‘man’, ‘and’, ‘am’, ‘all’, ‘a’—contain it. When 
this ubiquitous sound is coupled with the way every aspect of the universe is 
merged together with connectives and embraced by repeated ‘all’s, we have 
the impression that man, language and the universe are merging together in a 
paean of ecstatic oneness.17
 
What is striking about this passage is that it highlights a textual feature—the 
repetition of ‘and’ and ‘all’—which might in other contexts be thought a defect, far 
less a mark of fine writing. But the critic identifies an aesthetic function for this 
rhetorical feature and assigns both significance and value to it. The aesthetic 
significance of the repetition emerges from the particularities of the poetic context and 
the construction put upon it. The example demonstrates a fundamental aspect of 
literary aesthetic effect: the consonance of means to end. The critic’s aesthetic 
appreciation of the passage lies in perceiving a consonance between the formal means 
and the further poetic purpose of expressing “nature’s multitudinousness” and the 
“ecstatic oneness” of man and universe. The appreciation does not rest on the 
rhetorical feature (the textual feature) alone. 
 
IV 
 
Just as it is wrong to reduce literature—and the aesthetic qualities of literature—to 
fine writing so it is wrong to reduce literature to language or meaning per se. Literary 
works are not simply strings of sentences to be assigned meaning—in a word they are 
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not simply texts. Extreme textualists in effect dismiss the idea that there is anything 
distinctive about literary works among other kinds of texts. They hold, with Roland 
Barthes, that texts are undifferentiated “writing”, or écriture, waiting for readers to 
fashion into their own meanings,18 or with Richard Rorty that “the coherence of the 
text … is no more than the fact that someone has found something interesting to say 
about a group of marks and noises”.19 It is not just the aesthetic interest in literature 
that gets lost under such reduction but literature itself as a meaningful category.  
 
A more subtle form of linguistic reductionism, short of textualism, takes literary 
works to be contextualised utterances akin to utterances in any form of 
communicative exchange. Noël Carroll is well known for promoting the analogy 
between literary writing and conversation20 and Robert Stecker identifies what he 
calls “work meaning” with “utterance meaning”.21 On this view there is no difference 
in principle between writing a novel, writing a letter, or making a political speech. All 
manifest the same desire to convey meaning. All invite the same goal of 
understanding and success is judged on whether the meaning is conveyed. It is no 
wonder that the debate about intentions is so prominent among philosophers who start 
with this premise about literature. The primary questions become what kind of 
meaning is conveyed and what are the constraints in grasping that meaning: is it the 
explicitly intended meaning of the author, is it the contextualised meaning of the 
words used, is it the meaning of an utterance combining intention and convention, and 
so forth? 
 
I suggest that this framework is utterly misconceived; the emphasis on conveying and 
grasping meanings distracts attention from more fundamental issues about what 
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literary works are and what they are valued for. Significantly there is no intention 
debate about aesthetic description. If we are to pursue the possibility of an aesthetics 
of literature it will be necessary to move beyond a focus on utterances and their 
meanings. A radical shift is needed from the picture of an author producing a text, 
communicating a meaning, and inviting understanding, to that of an author creating a 
work, engaging a practice, and inviting appreciation.22 It is the latter that must 
underpin any coherent, non-reductive aesthetics of literature.  
 
There is no denying, of course, that literary works are associated with texts and 
meanings nor that the question of what a particular phrase or sentence means will 
inevitably arise. This is sometimes called “explication”. The mistake is to suppose 
that explication is a model for literary interpretation or literary appreciation. Consider 
this example. Edmund Spenser’s poem Epithalamion written in 1594 demands a great 
deal of explication, at least for modern readers. Here is part of stanza 9: 
Loe where she comes along with portly pace, 
Lyke Phoebe from her chamber in the East, 
Arysing forth to run her mighty race, 
Clad all in white, that seemes a virgin best. 
So well it her beseemes that ye would weene 
Some angell she had beene. 
Her long loose yellow locks lyke golden wyre, 
Sprinckled with perle, and perling flowers a tweene, 
Does lyke a golden mantle her attyre, 
And being crownéd with a girland greene, 
Seeme lyke some mayden Queene. 
 
The meanings of Elizabethan words—“portly” (stately), “seemes” (suits), “weene” 
(expect), or “perling” (winding)—need to be recovered, as do the classical or 
mythological references to the likes of Phoebe (goddess of the moon). The expression 
“mayden Queene” must be recognized as an allusion to Queen Elizabeth I. A 
scholarly edition will make such matters clear with the aim of aiding understanding. 
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There is little need to refer to Spenser’s intentions as the recovered facts rest on 
shared contemporary knowledge.  
 
However, the pursuit of textual or utterance meaning in this vein is a bare preliminary 
to an appreciation of Spenser’s poem as a literary work. Such appreciation only 
begins with the recognition that the poem belongs in the conventionalized 
“epithalamic” tradition popular in the Renaissance but dating back to the Roman poet 
Catullus. Epithalamia are celebrations of weddings, following strict conventions of 
versification, imagery, epithets, and temporal structure, with a conventional 
progression through the religious rites, the processions, the banqueting, the singing 
and revelry, the retreat of bride and groom to the bedchamber, to the final 
consummation.  
 
What becomes salient in appreciation of Spenser’s poem is not the way he follows 
convention or uses conventional imagery, but rather how he departs from convention 
to produce something unusual and unique. Unusually, for example, the poem is about 
the poet’s own wedding, fusing the role of bridegroom and poet-speaker. References 
to the bride’s beauty take on a personal not merely conventional colour. Another 
unconventional motif is, in the words of a critic, the recurring  
 
ominous associations of darkness …[for example] where the stars are 
described as torches in the temple of heaven 
that to us wretched earthly clods 
In dreadful darkness lend desired light … 
 
Here it is not only the marriage but the whole of human experience which is 
menaced by the night’s sad dread. Thus the threat of disaster, the irrational 
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fear of vaguely specified suffering, hovers faintly over the poem, lending 
particular urgency to the concluding prayers.23
 
Literary critical observations of this kind move some distance from a search for 
utterance or conversational meaning. The exploitation of and departure from specific 
poetic conventions already provides a richer context for appreciation than afforded by 
any effort merely to understand the poem’s meaning. That the “threat of disaster … 
hovers faintly over the poem” is a fact, if a fact at all, not about meaning but about 
tone and mood.  
 
The appreciation of Spenser’s poem arises not only from recognition of its 
embeddedness in a poetic tradition but also from wider expectations of literary art per 
se. Appreciating the poem involves locating it both in the specific context of the 
epithalamic tradition and in the context of poetic art more widely conceived. It is 
integral to the practice of reading a poem as a poem that interest is given to structural 
and thematic unity. Again the focus is not on what the poem means—beyond textual 
explication—but on how the poem works, how its effects are achieved. Here is a critic 
noticing such aspects in Epithalamion: 
 
The world of the poem may be seen as a series of concentric areas. In the 
center is the couple, always at the dramatic focus; about them lies the town, 
the “social context”—the merchants’ daughters, the young men who ring the 
bells, the boys who cry “Hymen” with “strong confused noyse”; beyond lies 
the natural setting, the woods that echo the jubilation with an answering joy 
…; vaguely outside of this is the world of classical figures, the Muses and the 
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Graces, Maia and Alsmena, Hera, Cynthia, and Hymen, …; finally above all 
these realms stretches the thinly disguised Christian Heaven, the “temple of 
the gods,” lending light to wretched earthly clods. The poem begins and ends 
with the widest perspective; at the center of the poem, during the ceremony, 
the focus has narrowed to the couple itself. Immediately before and after the 
ceremony the focus includes the “social context.” The opening, with its 
perspective into the past, is balanced by the concluding perspective into the 
future. Thus, structurally as well as thematically, the amplitude is 
complemented with an elegant symmetry and an intricate harmony.24
 
It is not fortuitous that the critic ends this analysis by using aesthetic terms like 
“elegant symmetry” and “intricate harmony”. For what the analysis has identified is 
an aesthetic feature, not merely a textual feature, of the poem. The idea of there being 
concentric circles unifying the work structurally and thematically, with the couple at 
the centre and the Christian heaven round the perimeter, is not “given” in the text, 
implied by semantic content, but is an “emergent” feature imaginatively reconstructed 
by a reader seeking a distinctive kind of appreciation from the work. That readers of 
literary art should seek symmetries and unity and connectedness of this kind (both 
formally and through any generalised vision that a work embodies) is not just a 
contingent aspect of particular interests but is essential to the mode of response 
demanded by the very practice of literature. Literary works are defined as works that 
invite and reward such a response. This is at the heart of what makes literature a 
suitable object for aesthetic appraisal and is not reducible to facts about linguistic 
meaning. 
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V 
 
The examples I have offered so far are from poems and it might be thought that in 
focusing on poetry I have made the case for an aesthetics of literature too easy. Few 
would disagree that poetic art exhibits aesthetic features, even if, as I have tried to 
show, there is not clear agreement on what such features are. But what about literary 
works in prose: the novel or narrative fiction?  
 
In fact I don’t believe that from an aesthetic point of view there is a difference in kind 
or that prose fiction is any less susceptible to aesthetic appraisal or appraisal as art. 
One problem is that narrative fiction, more so than poetry, encourages a bifurcation of 
interest that in one form or another runs through all literary criticism: interest, on the 
one hand, in structures, devises, narrative styles and modes, narrators and implied 
authors, and, on the other, interest in the human dramas depicted, the people, the 
conflicts, the politics, the emotions, the sociological and psychological implications. 
The latter interest, especially when turned into ideology, can seem remote from 
aesthetics, but the former can seem remote from what matters about the novel.  
 
The aesthetic interest in the novel as an art form should not, again, be reduced to 
formalistic considerations. Surprisingly, though, when philosophers turn to the novel 
it is not that kind of reduction that tempts them but another kind that sees narrative art 
primarily in terms of plot and character and “world”. A great deal has been written 
about fictional worlds, truth in fiction, and the status of fictional characters but little 
of that, however intrinsically interesting, has much to do with aesthetics. It is 
reductive to the extent that it takes fictional description to be transparent, to depict 
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people in fictional worlds exactly as a historian or biographer might depict real 
people.  To read and understand a fictional narrative, on reductive views, is to grasp 
the “facts” about a fictional world either through “make believe” or by projecting, in 
some other way, worlds, in David Lewis’s terms, where the fiction is “told as known 
fact”. What such attention to narrative misses is precisely what makes narratives a 
focus for aesthetics, namely, the modes by which the “world” is presented and the 
lack of transparency in fictional description. 
 
The “world”, for example, of Dickens’ Bleak House is not merely Victorian London 
or even Dickensian London drawn as a more or less realistic backdrop for the action 
of the novel, it is itself an elaborate imaginative construct built on a wealth of fine-
grained description and infused throughout with symbolic significance. One critic 
characterises this world as follows:  
 
The mud and fog of the opening paragraph of the novel …are the symptoms of 
a general return to the primal slime, a return to chaos which is going on 
everywhere in the novel and is already nearing its final end when the novel 
begins. 
 The human condition of the characters of Bleak House is, then, to be 
thrown into a world … which has already gone bad.25
 
In describing the “decay and disintegration” that is a defining feature of this world, 
the critic notes “the great number of disorderly, dirty, broken-down interiors”: 
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The Jellyby household is “nothing but bills, dirt, waste, noise, tumbles down-
stairs, confusion, and wretchedness”. At the time of the preparations for Caddy 
Jellyby’s marriage “nothing belonging to the family, which it had been 
possible to break, was unbroken …; nothing which it had been possible to 
spoil in any way, was unspoilt …”. … Skimpole’s house too is “in a state of 
dilapidation”, Symond’s Inn, where Richard Carstone’s lawyer, Vholes, lives, 
has been made “of old building materials, which took kindly to the dry rot and 
to dirt and to all things decaying and dismal”, and Richard himself lives in a 
room which is full of “a great confusion of clothes, tin cases, books, boots, 
brushes, and portmanteaus, strewn all about the floor”. The “dusty bundles of 
papers” in his room seem to Esther “like dusty mirrors reflecting his own 
mind”.26
 
After citing evidence of this kind from across the novel the critic draws a thematic 
conclusion: “one of the basic symbolic equations … is the suggested parallel between 
… two forms of disintegration”, “physical or spiritual”: “either the destruction of the 
individual through his absorption in the impersonal institution of ‘law and equity’, or 
the dissolution of all solid material form in ‘that kindred mystery, the street mud 
…’”.27
 
Here we see the typical practice of the critic, making connections and finding 
generalised descriptions to characterise a recurrent theme. The very identity of the 
“world” rests on the mode of its presentation in the novel. There is no independent 
perspective on this world—the decay and disintegration are not contingent features 
but help determine what the world is—and the symbolic significance borne by its 
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characterisation is essential to its identity. The same is true of the modes of 
presentation of the fictional characters for how they are presented is likewise 
indivisible from what they are. Characters are perspectival entities in the sense that 
they have their identity “under a description”.28 When the character Krook dies of 
spontaneous combustion his horrific demise symbolises another return to the basic 
elements of disintegration, the fog and the mud, manifested in the “thick yellow 
liquor” on the window sill. His death, “inborn, inbred, engendered in the corrupted 
humours of the vicious body itself”29 is not just an event in the world but an image 
through which to imagine that world. 
 
These quasi-ontological points about fictional worlds and characters are crucial to 
aesthetics. They show that appreciation of narrative content is not (merely) a factual 
investigation into what is true in a possible world but an imaginative reconstruction of 
an artefact of language.30 Grasp of the propositional content of the narrative sentences 
is not enough to apprehend the “world” and characters presented. Something more 
like a Sibleyan gestalt is needed to appreciate the significance of the descriptive 
content and the interconnectedness of its elements. A principle of functionality 
operates that is not applicable to fact-based narratives, namely that for any element of 
the narrative (a phrase, a sentence, a passage, as well as an incident, a character, or a 
description of place) it is always legitimate to ask what function that element is 
performing. An answer to the question—an interpretative judgment locating the 
element within a broader perspective—will help to indicate not the meaning of the 
work but how it works and where its interest lies. 
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The appreciation of fictive narrative in prose is not fundamentally different from that 
of poetry. In both a special kind of discernment is called for which goes beyond mere 
comprehension of the text and presupposes initiation into a distinctive practice of 
reading. A reader approaching a text from a literary point of view has expectations 
about what rewards will flow from giving it that kind of attention. The expectation is 
of a value-experience. A work that affords little by way of internal connectedness, 
thematic unity, complexity of structure, and a generalised vision arising out of the 
particularities of the subject, will not reward literary attention and will be open to at 
best limited aesthetic appreciation. 
 
VI 
 
I do not know if any of this would persuade Geoffrey Hartman or John Guillory that 
applying aesthetics to literature is a worthwhile activity. The aesthetic pleasure that I 
have called “appreciation” is very unlike the reductive sensual pleasures that Frank 
Kermode promoted and they rejected. In fact we seem to have come full circle for the 
response to literature as literature or as art that I have outlined is in essence familiar 
to literary critics. It has not elevated one mode of literature over another, poetry or 
narrative, and it has discarded formalism and the belleslettrist conception of literature. 
It has also repudiated a tendency among philosophers, alienating to critics, to see 
narrative fiction as a mere window onto alternative worlds, peopled by facsimiles of 
ourselves. Not only do critics reject the assumption of realism but, rightly, they are 
suspicious of the implied conception of realism as transparency.  
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My argument has been that a substantial aesthetics of literature must avoid misplaced 
emphasis in three areas: on intrinsic textual properties, on the priority of meaning, and 
on reductive views of plot and character. That need not be uncongenial to literary 
critics. The argument has promoted various distinctions not universally acknowledged 
by critics but not at odds with basic critical principles: between texts and works, 
specifically textual features and aesthetic ones, between appreciation and 
understanding, and between what something means and how something works. The 
aesthetic elements identified in literature are not simply well-crafted turns of phrase or 
expressive images—although everyone agrees such things exist—but rather emergent 
qualities that become salient when appropriate attention is directed to works. There is 
a kind of perception involved in discerning such qualities and ultimately it is a source 
of pleasure. In that sense there need be no watering down of aesthetics when applied 
to literature. 
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